طراحی مدل حکمرانی شرکت‌های دولتی در چارچوب سیاست‌های کلی اقتصاد مقاومتی

نوع مقاله : مقاله علمی پژوهشی

نویسندگان

1 گروه رهبری و سرمایه انسانی، دانشکده مدیریت، دانشگاه تهران، تهران ایران.

2 دانشیار، گروه رهبری و سرمایه انسانی، دانشکده مدیریت، دانشگاه تهران، تهران، ایران.

3 استاد، گروه رهبری و سرمایه انسانی، دانشکده مدیریت، دانشگاه تهران، تهران، ایران.

4 استاد، گروه اقتصاد، مرکز تحقیقات استراتژیک مجمع تشخیص مصلحت نظام، تهران، ایران.

چکیده

هدف: شرکت‌های دولتی در صنایع حساس، استراتژیک و زیرساختی مانند انرژی و حمل‌ونقل فعالیت می‌کنند. اداره این شرکت‌ها بایستی مبتنی بر نظام حکمرانی خاص و مشخصی صورت گیرد؛ این در حالی است که در کشور، مدل یا سیستم خاصی برای حکمرانی شرکت‌های دولتی وجود ندارد. از این ‌رو، هدف از این پژوهش، طراحی مدل حکمرانی شرکتی در شرکت‌های دولتی با بهره‌گیری از اقتضائات و رهنمودهای سیاست‌های کلی اقتصاد مقاومتی است.
روش: پژوهش حاضر از روش‌شناسی آمیخته بهره برده است. در مرحله نخست، به‌منظور شناسایی الزامات و اقتضائات سیاست‌های کلی اقتصاد مقاومتی برای حکمرانی شرکت‌های دولتی، داده‌های مرتبط با متن «سیاست‌های کلی اقتصاد مقاومتی»، ادبیات نظری و 19 مصاحبه عمیق و نیمه‌ساختاریافته با خبرگان با استفاده از روش تحلیل تم، تجزیه‌وتحلیل شد. در مرحله دوم و در بخش کمّی پژوهش، به‌منظور بررسی اعتبار مدل طراحی‌شده، یافته‌های مرحله دوم در قالب پرسش‏نامه‌ای طراحی و از طریق روش دلفی فازی تجزیه‌وتحلیل شد.
یافته‌ها: تجزیه‌وتحلیل داده‌ها در بخش کیفی، حاکی از این است که مدل حکمرانی شرکتی مبتنی بر سیاست‌های کلی اقتصاد مقاومتی، بایستی بر مبنای چهار ویژگی «انطباق‌پذیری»، «عدالت مشارکت‌محور»، «فسادزدایی و سلامت» و «مدیریت جهادی» طراحی شود. در ادامه تحلیل ادبیات نظری و مصاحبه‌های انجام‌شده، 103 مفهوم در راستای الزامات تحقق این ویژگی‌ها شناسایی شد که در قالب 22 تم فرعی انتزاع یافت. همچنین نتایج اعتبارسنجی این تم‌های فرعی، به‌مثابه الزامات طراحی مدل حکمرانی مطلوب در مرحله دوم، نشان داد که کلیه این الزامات، به‌استثنای یک مورد، به تأیید خبرگان رسیده است.
نتیجه‌گیری: به خط‌مشی‌گذاران و تصمیم‌گیرندگان توصیه می‌شود که برای محقق‌ساختن نظام حکمرانی شرکتی مبتنی بر سیاست‌های کلی اقتصاد مقاومتی، «پیچیدگی و تنوع‌بخشی»، «ذی‏نفع‌محوری»، «شفافیت اطلاعات» و «خادمیت» را در طراحی مدل مطلوب مدنظر قرار دهند.

کلیدواژه‌ها

عنوان مقاله [English]

Designing a Governance Model for State-owned Enterprises under General Policies of Resistance Economy

نویسندگان [English]

  • Vahid Beygi 1
  • Mohammad Abooyee Ardakan 2
  • Seyyd Mohammad Moghimi 3
  • Mohammad Bagher Nobakht 4
1 Ph.D., Department of Leadership and Human Capital, Faculty of Management, University of Tehran, Iran.
2 Associate Prof., Department of Leadership and Human Capital, Faculty of Management, University of Tehran, Iran.
3 Prof., Department of Leadership and Human Capital, Faculty of Management, University of Tehran, Iran.
4 Prof., Department of Economic, Institute for Strategic Research, Expediency Council, Tehran, Iran.
چکیده [English]

Objective
The purpose of this study is to design a model of corporate governance in state-owned enterprises (SOE) by meeting the requirements and following guidelines of the general policies on the economy of resistance (GPER). SOEs operate in critical, strategic, and infrastructure industries such as energy and transportation. Enterprise administration in SOEs should rely on a specified governance system; however, there is no specific model or system for governing them in Iran.
Methods
The present study applied a mixed methodology. To identify GPER requirements for the governance of SOEs, in the initial phase of the study, the related theoretical literature and 19 in-depth and semi-structured interviews with experts were analyzed using the thematic analysis method. In its second phase, i.e. the quantitative part, to assess the validity of the designed model, the obtained findings were formed into a questionnaire and then analyzed by the fuzzy Delphi method.
Results
The data analysis carried out in the qualitative phase of the current study suggested that the corporate governance model based on the GPER should be designed based on four characteristics of "adaptability", "participation-oriented justice", "fight against corruption" and "Jihadi management". Next, the theoretical literature and interviews were analyzed to identify the requirements for the realization of these features. Subsequently, 103 concepts and 22 sub-themes were identified. In addition, the achieved sub-themes were validated as requirements for designing a good governance model, verifying that all these requirements, except for one case, were approved by the experts.
Conclusion
According to its obtained findings, this study suggests policymakers consider "complexity and diversification", "stakeholder approach", "information transparency" and "stewardship" in designing the desired model of a GPER-based corporate governance system.

کلیدواژه‌ها [English]

  • Governance
  • Corporate governance
  • State-owned enterprises
  • Resistance economy

مراجع

قلی‌پور، رحمت الله و امین ناصری (1396)، جایگاه اصول حاکمیت شرکتی خوب در سیاستهای اقتصادی ایران (مورد مطالعه سیاست‏های اصل 44 قانون اساسی). فصلنامه مجلس و راهبرد، 24 (89)، 223-248.
 
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مدیریت دولتی
دوره 15، شماره 1
1402
صفحه 12-40

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