بررسی تجربی تأثیر حاکمیت شرکتی در کارایی تخصیص سرمایه شرکت‌های عمومی

نوع مقاله : مقاله علمی پژوهشی

نویسندگان

1 استادیار، گروه بازاریابی و استراتژی کسب‌وکار، دانشکده مدیریت، دانشگاه تهران، تهران، ایران.

2 کارشناس ارشد، گروه مدیریت کسب‌وکار، دانشکده مدیریت، دانشگاه تهران، تهران، ایران.

3 دانشجوی دکتری، گروه مهندسی مالی، دانشکده مدیریت، دانشگاه تهران، تهران، ایران.

10.22059/jipa.2022.346457.3188

چکیده

هدف: پژوهش‌های پیشین بر نقش حاکمیت شرکتی بر هم‌راستا کردن منافع مدیران ارشد و سهام‌داران و بهبود عملکرد شرکت تأکید کرده‌اند. اگر ساختار حکمرانی هزینه نمایندگی را کاهش می‌دهد، می‌توان انتظار داشت شرکت‌هایی که حکمرانی مطلوبی دارند، در تخصیص سرمایه، مشکلات کمتری‌ داشته باشند و سرمایه‌گذاری کاراتری انجام دهند. در این پژوهش، رابطه میان مؤلفه‌های حاکمیت شرکتی و کارایی تخصیص سرمایه در شرکت‌های پذیرفته‌شده در بورس اوراق بهادار تهران بررسی شده است.
روش: به‌منظور دستیابی به هدف پژوهش، 80 شرکت پذیرفته‌شده در بورس اوراق بهادار تهران، به‌روش حذف سیستماتیک برای دوره زمانی 1394 تا 1397 انتخاب شد و تجزیه‌وتحلیل آزمون فرضیه‌های پژوهش با استفاده از مدل رگرسیونی چندمتغیره و روش داده‌های پانل با اثرهای ثابت انجام گرفت.
یافته‌ها: مطابق با مبانی نظری و یافته‌های پژوهش، حاکمیت شرکتی با کارایی سرمایه‌گذاری رابطه معناداری دارد. همچنین، نتایج پژوهش نشان می‌دهد که میان متغیرهای حاکمیت شرکتی استقلال هیئت‌مدیره، ساختار رهبری، اندازه هیئت‌مدیره، مالکیت بلوکی و وجود اعضای غیرموظف در کمیته حسابرسی و کارایی سرمایه‌گذاری رابطه معناداری وجود ندارد. همچنین میان مالکیت نهادی و کارایی سرمایه‌گذاری رابطه معنادار و مثبت وجود دارد.
نتیجه‌گیری: نتایج پژوهش مؤید ارتباط معنادار کارایی سرمایه‌گذاری و حاکمیت شرکتی است. در واقع انتظار می‌رود با افزایش کیفیت ساختار حاکمیت شرکتی، کارایی سرمایه‌گذاری بهبود یابد. از سوی دیگر، از میان مؤلفه‌های حاکمیت شرکتی، فقط ارتباط معنادار و مثبت میان وجود سرمایه‌گذاران نهادی و کارایی سرمایه‌گذاری تأیید شد. در واقع، حضور سهام‌داران نهادی در ساختار مالکیت و به‌تبع آن، نماینده آن‌ها در هیئت‌مدیره، می‌تواند نظارت بهتر و اتخاذ تصمیم‌های کاراتر در تخصیص سرمایه را سبب‌ شود. میان سایر مؤلفه‌های حاکمیت شرکتی، یعنی مالکیت بلوکی، اندازه هیئت‌مدیره، تعداد اعضای مستقل کمیته حسابرسی و ساختار رهبری با کارایی تخصیص سرمایه مبتنی بر نظریه نمایندگی رابطه‌ای وجود ندارد؛ بنابراین نظریه نمایندگی قادر نیست که این روابط را تبیین کند و باید به جنبه‌های رفتاری و محدودیت‌های ناشی از الزامات قانونی نیز توجه شود.

کلیدواژه‌ها


عنوان مقاله [English]

Investigating the Impact of Corporate Governance on the Capital Allocation Efficiency

نویسندگان [English]

  • Hamed Vares 1
  • Ali Salavatizadeh 2
  • Mohammad Javad Bannazadeh 3
1 Assistant Prof., Department of Marketing and Business Strategy, Faculty of Management, University of Tehran, Tehran, Iran.
2 MSc. Department of MBA, Faculty of Management, University of Tehran, Tehran, Iran.
3 PhD. Candidate, Department of Financial Engineering, Faculty of Management, University of Tehran, Tehran, Iran.
چکیده [English]

Objective
The role of corporate governance in matching the interests of senior executives with those of the shareholders’ interests has been investigated in previous studies. If corporate governance can reduce agency costs, companies with good governance may have fewer unfavorable issues in their capital allocation. The main purpose of this study is to examine the relationship between the components of corporate governance and the efficiency of capital allocation in public joint stock companies.
Methods
In order to study and achieve the objectives of the research, 80 companies listed on the Tehran Stock Exchange (TSE), from 2015 to 2018, were selected via the purposive sampling method. The research hypotheses were tested using the panel data and fixed effects model.
Results
According to research findings, corporate governance has a significant relationship with investment efficiency. The results also showed no significant relationship between investment efficiency and corporate governance variables including independence of the board of directors, leadership structure, the number of members of the board of directors, block-holder ownership, and the presence of outside directors in the audit committee. There is also a significant and positive relationship between institutional ownership and investment efficiency
Conclusion
The achieved results of the present study confirm the significant relationship between investment efficiency and corporate governance. Accordingly, investment efficiency is expected to improve as the quality of the corporate governance structure increases. Only a significant relationship between the existence of institutional investors as a corporate governance variable with investment efficiency was proved. The presence of institutional shareholders in the ownership structure and, consequently, their representative on the board of directors, can lead to better control and more efficient decision-making in capital allocation. On the other hand, there was found no empirical evidence for the relationship between other corporate governance variables such as board independence, leadership structure, board size, block ownership, and the presence of outside directors in the audit committee with investment efficiency as the agency theory proposes. The agency theory cannot explain the empirical findings; therefore, the behavioral aspect and legal limitations and requirements are required to be considered.

کلیدواژه‌ها [English]

  • Corporate governance
  • Capital allocation
  • Investment efficiency
  • Corporate governance components
  • Tehran Stock Exchange (TSE)
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دستگیر، محسن؛ جلالی جلال آبادی، مژگان و گوگردچیان، احمد (1395). تأثیر نظام حاکمیت شرکتی بر شاخص واحد کارایی مدیریت سرمایه در گردش در شرکت‌های پذیرفته شده در بورس اوراق بهادار تهران. مدیریت دارایی و تأمین مالی، 4(1)، 69-86.
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هاشمی، محمدصادق؛ معینیان، امین و نرگسیان، عباس (1399). تبیین نقش ساختار مالکیت بنگاه در فرایند تصمیم‌گیری استراتژیک هیئت‌مدیره: مطالعه چندموردی بانک‌های دولتی، شبه‌خصوصی و خصوصی. مدیریت دولتی، 12(3)، 550-583.
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