نوع مقاله : مقاله علمی پژوهشی
نویسندگان
1 دانشجوی دکتری، گروه مدیریت دولتی، دانشکده مدیریت و اقتصاد، دانشگاه تربیت مدرس، تهران، ایران.
2 استاد، گروه مدیریت دولتی، دانشکده مدیریت و اقتصاد، دانشگاه تربیت مدرس، تهران، ایران.
3 استادیار، گروه مدیریت دولتی، دانشکده مدیریت و اقتصاد، دانشگاه تربیت مدرس، تهران، ایران.
4 استادیار، گروه برنامهریزی و مدیریت، مرکز مطالعات مدیریت و توسعه فناوری، دانشگاه تربیت مدرس، تهران، ایران.
5 دانشیار، گروه مدیریت دولتی، دانشکده مدیریت و اقتصاد، دانشگاه تربیت مدرس، تهران، ایران.
چکیده
کلیدواژهها
موضوعات
عنوان مقاله [English]
نویسندگان [English]
Objective
This study seeks to identify and analyze the reasons behind government inaction in certain public domains, in order to address the fundamental question: why does the government in Iran, despite recognizing public problems and facing clear societal expectations for intervention, adopt a strategy of inaction or passivity in specific areas of public policy? Understanding the roots of such inaction is vital for improving responsiveness, accountability, and the legitimacy of governance.
Methods
The research employed a qualitative content analysis method based on the approach of Elo and Kyngäs (2008). Using purposive sampling, 33 semi-structured interviews were conducted with participants including government officials, members of parliament, university professors with executive experience, and policy scholars. The analysis followed three stages—preparation, organization, and reporting. Ultimately, four main categories were extracted: structural and institutional, cognitive and behavioral, political and electoral, and environmental and contextual. Together, these categories provided a comprehensive, multidimensional framework for explaining government inaction.
Results
The analysis identified four main categories and 20 subcategories of factors contributing to policy inaction.
Structural and institutional: Bureaucratic inefficiency, overreliance on traditional procedures, dependence on outdated administrative systems and paperwork, lack of coordination among governmental bodies, and overlapping duties all create systemic inertia. Additionally, entrenched networks of vested interests and conflicts of interest incentivize individuals and groups to resist structural reforms.
Cognitive and behavioral: Psychological biases such as blame avoidance, risk aversion, optimism bias toward the status quo, reliance on intuitive shortcuts, and limited analytical capacity consolidate resistance to change. These dynamics generate cycles of passivity and blame-shifting among policymakers.
Political and electoral: Short-term calculations driven by electoral pressures, populist tendencies, issue avoidance, and policy myopia push policymakers toward symbolic or performative decisions, while deterring engagement with long-term reforms and fundamental action.
Environmental and contextual: Crises, natural disasters, climate and geopolitical conditions, as well as international and media pressures, restrict the government’s ability to respond promptly to emerging issues and create external conditions that reinforce inaction.
Conclusion
The study concludes that policy inaction is a multidimensional phenomenon shaped by the interaction of structural/institutional, cognitive/behavioral, political/electoral, and environmental/contextual factors. Such inaction not only undermines the government’s capacity to respond in a timely and effective manner to essential societal needs but also erodes public trust and policy legitimacy. Addressing this challenge requires reforms along several lines: revisiting and modernizing administrative procedures, enhancing analytical capacity in policymaking, strengthening inter-institutional coordination, and mitigating conflicts of interest. Moreover, special attention must be paid to cognitive biases in decision-making, ensuring that policymakers adopt evidence-based frameworks that balance short-term risk management with long-term problem-solving. Reforming governmental processes and shifting the prevailing mindset from passivity to proactive engagement—supported by a knowledge-driven and culturally adaptive environment—can improve both efficiency and legitimacy. The findings highlight that reform strategies must prioritize internal coordination, reduce incentives for maintaining private interests, and encourage acceptance of reasonable risks. Such measures are essential not only for improving responsiveness to immediate challenges but also for preventing the long-term consequences of systemic inaction. Ultimately, the study offers an analytical framework that can help policymakers and scholars better understand the drivers of governmental passivity, providing pathways for reform in Iran and in other contexts characterized by complex governance structures and multidimensional challenges.
کلیدواژهها [English]
)