Pathology of the Government Budget Approval Stage and Solutions for Reforming the Structure of Iran’s Public Budget

Objective
This study aims to investigate the challenges and shortcomings of the government budget approval stage in Iran and to present practical solutions for reforming the structure of public budgeting. The approval stage holds strategic importance in realizing developmental objectives and plays a critical role in promoting financial transparency and strengthening governmental accountability. Identifying the weaknesses of this stage and offering actionable reform strategies is therefore essential. The primary purpose of this research is to systematically analyze the deficiencies of the budget approval process and to propose measures that enhance its efficiency, effectiveness, and alignment with national development goals.
Methods
The study was conducted using a qualitative approach and employed thematic analysis as the main methodological tool. The data set included semi-structured interviews with experts in public finance and governmental planning, along with budget documents and official reports. During the analysis, 173 initial codes were identified, which were refined into 102 selective codes, 34 sub-themes, and 14 overarching themes. The Braun and Clarke model of thematic analysis was applied, which enabled the identification of semantic patterns and the mapping of relationships among the various challenges of the budget approval process.
Results
The results reveal that the budget approval stage in Iran is confronted with multifaceted weaknesses. At the macro level, the dominance of regional and political considerations, the lack of a coherent national outlook, and localism in budgetary decision-making emerged as major concerns. Structurally, the parliamentary review of the budget bill is ineffective, characterized by the concentration of power in the Joint Budget Committee, the marginalization of specialized committees, and the absence of constructive participation in drafting budgetary provisions. These conditions have led to lower quality reviews and reduced effectiveness of parliamentary decisions. Further, extensive interventions by members of Parliament—often driven by political incentives rather than technical or economic considerations—have resulted in proposals without professional justification and provisions lacking technical and financial coherence. This has disrupted the structural integrity of the budget document. Additional findings include both procedural and substantive flaws in the approved budget, the introduction of new financial commitments without secured funding sources, weaknesses in the Parliament’s internal regulations, and inefficient interactions between government and Parliament. Oversight mechanisms during the approval stage were also found to be inadequate, with no effective tools for monitoring outcomes and limited accountability frameworks. Moreover, time constraints, heavy workloads, and the neglect of specialized review of state-owned enterprises’ budgets have compounded the operational challenges of the process.
Conclusion
The budget approval stage, situated at the intersection of fiscal policymaking and parliamentary decision-making, requires a comprehensive institutional and behavioral redesign. Based on the findings, several reform directions are proposed: (1) restructuring parliamentary review by empowering specialized committees and reducing the concentration of authority in the Joint Budget Committee; (2) enhancing transparency and competence through training programs for legislators, creating evaluation platforms, and curbing non-expert interventions; (3) revising the Parliament’s internal regulations to clarify responsibilities and streamline procedures; (4) fostering institutional collaboration between government and Parliament based on trust and information-sharing; and (5) strengthening oversight mechanisms to evaluate the outcomes and impacts of the approved budget. Ultimately, achieving a more effective and efficient budget structure at the approval stage depends on political will, the development of technical expertise, and the active participation of policy experts. Without such reforms, Iran’s public budgeting system will remain vulnerable to political maneuvering, structural inefficiencies, and persistent failure in realizing developmental goals.